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Summary
This paper examines economic determinants of bidding behavior in offshore
petroleum lease sales. Multiple regression analysis is used to measure the
explanatory influence of various firm-specific and tract-specific characteristics
that enter the bidding decision. The principal finding is that most bidders
display significant aversion to risk. An additional finding is that the magni-
tude of tendered bids is directly related to the number of competitors in the
market. The hypothesis that firms which are relatively short of petroleum
reserves bid more aggressively is not supported by the data.
Acknowledgment
This research was supported by grant no. 14-08-0001-G-419 of the U.S.
Geological Survey. The assistance of Holly Tomlinson and Carole Green is
gratefully acknowledged. However, the author alone is responsible for the
contents. The views and contents expressed here do not necessarily correspond
to those of the U.S. Government.

(Uf, 9-
RISK AVERSION AND BIDDING BEHAVIOR FOR OFFSHORE PETROLEUM LEASES
1. Introduction
The present paper examines economic determinants of bidding behav-
ior in petroleum lease sales on the United States Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS) . Factors which presumably condition the magnitude of a
firm's bid include: the expected economic value of the potential re-
source; the degree of uncertainty which surrounds this value; the antic-
ipated degree of competition to acquire the tract in question; and the
firm's capacity to bear significant financial risks. We show below
that systematic differences in these factors do significantly account
for observed fluctuations in the magnitude of tendered bids.
Economic factors that impact bidding behavior are of considerable
interest to auction participants and to the federal government, which
administers the auction procedure. The interest of participants stems
from their desire to formulate successful bidding strategies appropriate
to their individual circumstances. The government's interest derives
from the legal responsibility to design an auction procedure and adopt
policies that elicit "fair" bids from the participants. Many of the
leasing policy alternatives that we presently face (e.g., royalty bid-
ding, profit-share bidding, and bonus bidding with sliding-scale royal-
ties) can be expected to affect significantly the underlying factors
(i.e., prospective risks and resource values, and the degree of competi-
tion) that influence bidding behavior. An informed choice between cur-
rent policy options requires some empirical knowledge of the impact
which these factors exert on the strategic bidding behavior of firms.
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2. Theoretical Ambiguities
Theoretical research has helped to clarify the influence which
various economic factors exert on the bidding behavior of profit-
maximizing firms. A summary of results is provided in the recent survey
article by Englebrecht-Wiggans . However, theoretical formulations leave
several ambiguities that cannot be resolved without empirical analysis
of the particular market in question.
For example, it is well known that an increase in the number of
bidders for an item of certain value will cause all bidders to raise
their bids. Unfortunately, very few auctions offer the chance to bid
for an item whose value is known, so this simple and intuitive result
rarely applies. In the presence of uncertainty, the choice of a compet-
itive bidding strategy is complicated by the phenomenon of "winner's
curse"; i.e., the possibility that any particular firm will outbid its
competitors as a result of having over-valued the item in question. To
avoid this outcome each firm will adopt a less aggressive bidding strat-
egy than is indicated by the certainty model. As Smith has shown, pro-
nounced uncertainty may even cause the firm to reduce its bid as the
number of competitors increases. Capen, Clapp, and Campbell have pre-
viously advocated the use of such "non-aggressive" strategies in the
context of OCS lease sales, but the prevalence of this behavior has not
been determined.
We are also relatively ignorant of the effect of risk aversion in
OCS lease sales. The nature of petroleum exploration imposes signifi-
cant risks on auction participants. The traditional hypothesis of de-
creasing absolute risk aversion states that the premium required to
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induce a firm to accept such risks is inversely related to the size of
firm in question. This implies, ceterus paribus , that larger firms
would tender larger bids than their smaller counterparts. The applica-
bility of the hypothesis of decreasing risk aversion is supported by
Ramsey's and Millsaps and Ott's observation that bankruptcy risks are
systematically related to the size of OCS participants. However, to
the extent that nearly all participants are large, widely-held concerns,
the risk of bankruptcy may be small in absolute terms. Consequently,
it is not clear whether we should expect to observe systematic bidding
differentials among firms of varied size.
The theory of risk aversion also suggests that bids are discounted
in proportion to the perceived financial risk attending respective
tracts. The most risky tracts would then be expected, ceterus paribus
,
to receive relatively low bids. However, Tourihno's recent extension
of option pricing theory, in conjunction with the hypothesis of risk
neutrality, establishes that if an effective futures market exists for
petroleum reserves (including the option to sell short), then a higher
variance in prospective value will increase the expected price at which
the option (i.e., resource development) is exercised; thus leading to a
higher bid for the riskier tract.
In the remainder of this paper, we explore the empirical validity
of these and related hypotheses regarding OCS bidding behavior.
3. The Empirical Method
Multiple regression analysis is used to measure the explanatory
influence and statistical significance of various factors that account
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for observed fluctuations in OCS bids, both among firms and among
tracts. The estimated equations consist of linear and log-linear rela-
tionships between the amount of each firm's bid and a set of firm-
specific and tract-specific variables. The basic model includes three
factors which are thought to be of fundamental importance: (1) a pro-
spective estimate of tract value; (2) the size of the bidding firm; and
(3) the number of bidders competing for the tract. The simplest equa-
tion is of the form:
(1) ln(Bid ) = a + b
]L
«ln(NW
i )
+ b
2
«ln(N.) + b
3
«ln(V.) + e
±
.;
where Bid
.
= bid of the i firm on the j tract,
NW. = net worth of the i firm,
t*Vt
N number of bids on the j tract,
V = expected value of the j tract,
e = a normally distributed random disturbance.
Subsequently, additional variables are added whose relevance to
the bidding decision is more speculative. These variables include:
(1) the degree of the firm's self-sufficiency in crude oil production;
(2) the degree of the firm's self-sufficiency in petroleum refining;
and (3) two measures of tract-specific financial risks.
The implications of Equation 1 are straightforward where solo bids
are concerned. However, where a single bid is tendered collectively by
members of a bidding consortium (a joint bid), there is some question
regarding how the equation should be interpreted. In fact, it is pos-
sible to treat joint bids in the analysis, and the method for doing so
opens several interesting lines of inquiry.
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We apply a method of decomposition to split each joint bid into
"imputed" solo bids which describe the financial stake and potential re-
ward of each consortium member. Let the equity share of the k member
be represented by the symbol 6, (e.g., 35%). For that member it is as
if a solo bid were tendered in the amount of Bid... = 6 «Bid. . on a
tract whose prospective value is V , = 6 »V.. We assume the consortium
formulates a joint bid that imputes individual bids consistent with the
bidding preferences of each member (cf. Equation 1):
(2) ln(Bid*jk) = a + bylnOny + b 2 -ln(Nj ) + b3 'ln(V*k ) + e±jk .
If this were not true, the consortium would have saddled some member
with an effective bid that is inconsistent with its conception of appro-
priate behavior, and we would not expect that firm to remain a member
of the consortium. Indeed it is common to see individual consortium
members selectively withdraw from bidding on particular tracts.
Our method of joint bid decomposition does not imply that the mag-
nitude of an OCS bid is independent of whether the bid is tendered
jointly. If b_ < 1, the resulting concavity of Equation 2 implies that
the joint bid of the consortium exceeds the amount that individual mem-
bers would tender if bidding alone. Thus, the "diversification effect"
of joint bidding is represented implicitly in Equation 2.
To assess the validity of the bid decomposition procedure, we sepa-
rate all bids into two groups — solo versus imputed joint bids — from
which Equations 1 and 2 are estimated separately.
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4. The Data
The primary source of tract-specific data is the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS) , which prepares pre-sale evaluations of all offered
tracts. Since 1973 the method of pre-sale evaluation has been linked
to a Monte Carlo simulation model of offshore exploration and reservoir
development. The simulation model is designed to calculate the expected
net present value of each tract, while incorporating explicit probabil-
ity judgments regarding the volume and value of recoverable petroleum
reserves. Three elements of the simulation analysis are of interest
here
:
(1) Dry-hole Risk; a tract-specific parameter that reflects the
probability that no petroleum is present.
(2) Expected Value; the average simulated net present value of
the tract, incorporating the probability of dry holes.
(3) Development Risk; the standard deviation of simulated net
present value, conditional on the presence of petroleum.
The USGS "expected value" is the estimate of prospective tract value
that enters our regression analysis. "Dry-hole risk" and "development
risk" together summarize the degree of uncertainty regarding prospective
value
.
The USGS also provides miscellaneous accounting information regard-
ing OCS lease sales. The number of bids received on each tract, the
amount of each bid, and the identity of each bidding party are recorded
in the Lease Production and Revenue Database: System LPR-5 . If a bid
is tendered by a consortium, the membership composition is indicated on
the basis of equity shares.
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There is no administrative counterpart to the USGS that maintains
a comprehensive record of firm-specific information. Reports available
in the public domain provide only partial coverage of firms recently ac-
tive in OCS sales. The sample is both small and unrepresentative, with
only the operations of major companies being well documented.
Accordingly, we have extracted from corporate annual reports a
data set that represents financial and operating characteristics of
approximately 100 firms. The sample is not exhaustive, but it is be-
lieved to be representative of the group of OCS bidders. It includes
all major companies plus many small and intermediate-sized firms. The
information collected for each consists of annual observations over six
years (1971-76) on eight operating variables:
(1) total assets (5) crude oil proved reserves
(2) net worth (6) natural gas proved reserves
(3) crude oil production (7) rated refinery capacity
(4) natural gas production (8) actual refinery runs
The annual National Petroleum News Factbook Issue compiles data
taken from the annual reports of approximately thirty petroleum compa-
nies; only major companies are included. The Oil and Gas Journal peri-
odically reports similar operating data, but coverage is again limited
to major oil companies. The International Petroleum Encyclopedia ex-
tends the sample to roughly fifty major companies, but reports on a
restricted number of data items. The Financial Post Survey of Oils
compiles statistical abstracts of most Canadian oil companies based on
corporate annual reports and other information. The Federal Energy
Administration (FEA) has published (1976) the most comprehensive account
of the operations of integrated U.S. petroleum refiners, forty in number,
but no financial data are included in the FEA report. Separately, the
FEA (1975) reports the refining capacity of 154 U.S. refiners, but no
other operating information is included. John S. Herold, Inc., a pri-
vate investment analysis company, provides broader operating information
on 130 U.S. and foreign firms that are engaged in various phases of the
petroleum industry. The major limitation of this data source is that
objective and subjective appraisals of firms' operating positions are
intermingled.
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The variable names are mostly self-explanatory. Production and reserve
volumes are taken in physical units; i.e., barrels of oil and cubic
feet of gas. The complete data set is available on request from the
author
.
We have selected seven recent OCS sales for analysis. The partic-
ular sales are described in Table 1. Among the many lease sales that
have been held since 1954, analysis was confined to these seven for
three reasons:
(1) Each sale occurred after 1973, when tract-specific data from
the USGS simulation model became available.
(2) Each sale is classified as a "wildcat" offering of previously
unexplored territory. Consequently, we avoid informational
asymmetries that might otherwise arise among firms due to
prior experience in the area of the sale.
(3) Each sale drew bids on seventy or more tracts of widely
varied value. This provides a large and fairly rich bidding
record to support statistical analysis.
5. Empirical Results
The Basic Model
We initially present results pertaining to the basic explanatory
variables: net worth, tract value, and number of bidders. These vari-
ables appear to exert a strong influence on the magnitude of tendered
bids, and establish a benchmark for judging the contribution of other
variables to be considered subsequently.
Estimated coefficients of Equation 1 based on the set of solo bids
are presented in Table 2. Corresponding estimates of Equation 2 based
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on the set of imputed joint bids are presented in Table 3. The most
striking feature of the results is the significance of the three vari-
ables in accounting for observed fluctuations in the magnitude of bids.
Each of the three factors is apparently of fundamental importance to
the firm's behavior.
The number of competitors enters thirteen of fourteen equations at
the 1% significance level, always with a positive sign. The magnitude
of the coefficient ranges widely between 0.23 and 1.09, averaging
roughly 0.65. This indicates that a 100% increase in the degree of com-
petition has been associated historically with a 65% increase in the
magnitude of tendered bids, ceterus paribus . Neither set of results
(solo versus joint bids) produces a response elasticity that is signif-
icantly higher than the other, although the dispersion of results admit-
tedly leaves much uncertainty regarding the precise magnitude of the
stimulative effect of competition. There can be no doubt, however, that
the effect is positive. None of the fourteen equations supports the
hypothesis that the phenomenon of winner's curse has caused widespread
use of non-aggressive bidding strategies. This may indicate that bid-
ders have been misinformed regarding the optimal formulation of bidding
strategies. However, the industry's long experience with this particu-
lar auction market creates a strong presumption to the contrary; i.e.,
that the phenomenon of winner's curse does not play a role so pronounced
to require the adoption of non-aggressive behavior.
All coefficient estimates presented in this paper were obtained
by the method of ordinary least squares.
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The influence of tract value is very much as expected. Tract value
enters all fourteen equations with a positive sign, significant in
twelve cases at the 5% level. The finding that bids are monotonically
increasing in tract value confirms the theoretical results of Matthews,
Vickrey, and Wilson. Of greater interest is the finding that none of
the fourteen coefficients exceeds unity, which is the pivotal value for
determining the effect of diversification. As discussed in Section 3,
the concavity implied by b < 1 is sufficient to demonstrate that joint
bids are of greater magnitude than would be tendered by Individual con-
sortium members. The joint bid is evidently an effective institutional
device for diversifying risks that are by nature indivisible. The di-
rect effect of diversification is reflected in higher bids; the indirect
effect is reflected in the rapid historical growth of consortia forma-
tion relative to the practice of solo bidding.
The evidence regarding diversification is one indication that OCS
bidders are risk averse. This conclusion is supported further by the
performance of net worth in Tables 2 and 3. The coefficient of net
worth enters positively in twelve of the fourteen equations, significant
eleven times at the 5% level. Large firms have bid significantly more
than small firms, after controlling for tract value and the degree of
competition. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis of decreas-
ing absolute risk aversion. An alternative explanation is that large
firms are more efficient in the development of OCS reserves and therefore
The percentage of all bids tendered jointly, and of winning bids
tendered jointly, increased from 32% in the late 1950 's to nearly 70%
by the early 1970' s.
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place higher values on the potential resource. However, all firms typi-
cally contract with drilling specialists who provide development ser-
vices, so this explanation is not compelling. It would appear more
likely, a_ priori , that the bids of small firms reflect higher premia re-
quired as compensation for bearing a relatively large risk. This inter-
pretation is reinforced by additional corroborating evidence (presented
later) that firms systematically discount bids on relatively risky
tracts.
It is not coincidental that the influence of net worth is more
erratic among solo bids (Table 2) than among joint bids (Table 3). In
the solo bid equations, net worth enters significantly in only four of
the seven cases; and actually enters with a negative sign on two occa-
sions (but without statistical significance). This result should not
be considered to be a statistical aberration, but to accurately reflect
an important difference between the sets of solo and joint bids. The
solo bids in our sample were tendered primarily by the largest firms in
the industry, whereas the joint bids have been tendered by a wide range
of small and large firms. Consequently, there is considerably less
sample variation in the size of firms represented in the solo bid equa-
tions (see Table 4). This difference, in conjunction with smaller sam-
ple sizes, would account for the weaker statistical significance of solo
bid results.
Moreover, if we adopt the working hypothesis of decreasing risk
aversion, the disparate performance of net worth between solo and joint
bids follows as a logical consequence of the behavioral model. The
-15-
TABLE 4
SAMPLE VARIATION IN FIRMS' NET WORTH
Net Worth ($ billion)
PCS Sale
Sale 33: Solo Bids
Joint Bids
Sale 34: Solo Bids
Joint Bids
Sale 35: Solo Bids
Joint Bids
Sale 36: Solo Bids
Joint Bids
Sale 37: Solo Bids
Joint Bids
Sale 39: Solo Bids
Joint Bids
Sale 40: Solo Bids
Joint Bids
Mean Minimum Maximum
5.274 0.039 15.634
1.571 0.005 8.394
4.001 0.008 15.634
1.650 0.005 15.634
7.859 0.051 15.634
2.033 0.001 8.394
5.762 0.164 15.634
1.630 0.005 15.634
7.870 0.021 15.634
1.213 0.005 6.089
13.272 0.817 18.470
2.621 0.078 9.002
9.810 0.090 18.470
2.310 0.035 9.002
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average size of firms tendering solo bids ranges across sales from $4
billion to $13 billion, as compared to roughly $2 billion for firms
tendering joint bids. It is not surprising, then, that fluctuations in
net worth have been less influential in the determination of solo bids,
since the firms involved there are, by hypothesis, less averse to risk.
The preceeding argument suggests that the log-linear specification
(which implies a constant response elasticity) may be inappropriate as
a model of bidding behavior. To further explore this question we re-
specify the basic estimating equation as a quadratic relationship that
permits the relative influence of net worth to diminish and eventually
disappear where larger firms are concerned:
(3) Bid.. = a + b »NW. + b_«NW? + b.»N. + b , -V. + e...
ij Ii2i3j4jij
Consistent with the hypothesis of decreasing risk aversion, the expected
signs of b. and b„ are positive and negative, respectively. Moreover,
the "critical" firm size to attain risk neutrality (NW ) is determined
c
by: NW = -
-^b./b,,. Increments to wealth beyond NW fail to increase
c a X i. c
the tendered bid.
Estimates of Equation 3 based on solo and imputed joint bids are
presented in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. Both tables lend considerable
support to the hypothesis of decreasing risk aversion. Among joint bid
equations, the anticipated sign pattern occurs in six of seven cases.
Although the quadratic term is statistically significant in only four
instances, a consistent pattern is established across the seven sales.
Evaluation of the critical size to attain risk neutrality yields the
estimates reported in Table 7. None of the seven sales generates an
estimate that falls below $5 billion.
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Three of the four statistically significant estimates of NW range
between $5 billion and $7 billion. The fourth exceeds $19 billion. The
one estimate that is of marginal statistical significance (OCS 37) ex-
ceeds $5 billion only slightly.
TABLE 7: ESTIMATES OF CRITICAL FIRM SIZE
(in $ billion)
OCS Sale NW
c-
33 $ 5,145
34 19,412
36 6,424
37 5,045
39 6,865
For perspective, the firms in our sample range in size from less
than $5 million (Oxoco Oil Co.) to more than $18 billion (Exxon) in
terms of net worth. The seven "major" companies are of particular in-
terest. Of the seven, four hold net worth in excess of $7 billion
(Exxon, Texaco, Mobil, and Standard of California) . Net worth of the
remaining three (Gulf, Standard of Indiana, and Shell) ranges between
$4.6 billion and $6.9 billion. Thus, the seven majors are the only
firms that can reasonably be said to have attained risk neutrality.
This conclusion is reinforced by the analysis of solo bids (Table 5)
,
where the behavior of the seven majors is dominant and where the influ-
ence of fluctuation in net worth is of limited statistical significance.
Vertical Integration and Self-Sufficiency
Many participants in the OCS leasing market are vertically inte-
grated companies that engage in both production and refining of petro-
leum. It is frequently alleged that firms relatively short of crude
-20-
oil supplies bid more aggressively to acquire petroleum development
rights. We are not aware of any bidding models that establish this
result formally; rather, the assertion is usually supported by general
references to "security of supply" and "enhanced coordination" between
different segments of the industry. These justifications are most seri-
ously questioned because they ignore what many believe to be superior
mechanisms for ensuring and coordinating supply; i.e., the many alloca-
tive mechanisms which comprise the world petroleum market.
We have tested the "self-sufficiency hypothesis" by including two
additional variables in the basic estimating equation. The first vari-
able measures the ratio of the firm's production to proved reserves.
The second variable measures the ratio of the firm's refining through-
put to production. Both measures are taken from corporate annual re-
2
ports. The resulting estimating equation takes the following form:
(A) BidjLj = a + b1
-NW
i
+ b^^ +^ + b^ + b$^ + bg^g- + e±j
If self-sufficiency is advantageous to firms, then both ratios should
enter Equation A with positive coefficients.
The estimated coefficients are presented in Tables 7 and 8, which
reflect solo and imputed joint bids, respectively. Although these
estimates are not strictly comparable to those presented earlier (the
»
A recent example of this argument appears in the October 13, 1980
issue of Business Week .
2Self-sufficiency ratios used here refer to proved reserves, pro-
duction, and refining throughput in the North American Region. Alterna-
tive specifications which include proved plus provable reserves and
which incorporate world-wide operations were not found to materially
alter the results.
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sample has been condensed to eliminate firms for which self-sufficiency
data are not available), the previous pattern and significance of coef-
ficients is hardly affected by the added variables. However, the self-
sufficiency ratios themselves perform quite erratically. In only three
cases out of twenty-eight do the measures of self-sufficiency enter sig-
nificantly with the expected positive coefficient. In the majority of
cases the measures enter with a negative sign (three times with statis-
tical significance), in direct contradiction to the self-sufficiency
hypothesis. Public assertions aside, the hypothesis that self-
sufficiency is valued per se does not appear consistent with the actual
bidding behavior of firms in the industry.
Tract-Specific Risks
In this section we consider the influence of tract-specific risks
on bidding behavior. Analysis of this factor provides another test of
the hypothesis of risk aversion, and generally reinforces previous con-
clusions. To account for tract-specific risks we add two further vari-
ables to the basic estimating equation: (1) USGS pre-sale estimates of
dry-hole risk (DHR) , and (2) the standard deviation (SD) of development
value ascribed to each tract by the USCS. The revised estimating equation
takes the form:
(5) Bid., - a + b- -NW. + b-»HWT + b «N. + b.«V. + b c «DHR. + b^SIT + e,.ij Ii2i3j4j5j6jij
If greater financial risk is a factor that systematically depresses
bid levels, we would then expect both coefficients (b_ and b,) to enter
negatively. Alternatively, if the option pricing theory of asset
-24-
valuation applies (cf. Section 2) and firms are risk-neutral, we should
then expect the coefficient of development risk (b,) to enter positively.
Estimates of Equation 5 are presented in Tables 9 and 10, which
correspond to solo bids and imputed joint bids, respectively. The dry-
hole risk factor enters negatively in nine of twelve cases and displays
considerable statistical significance. In no case does this factor en-
ter with a significant positive sign. Because expected tract value
(inclusive of dry-hole risk) has been controlled elsewhere in the equa-
tion, our results imply that firms value small but sure prospects more
highly than those that are large but risky — even though their actuar-
ial value is the same . What may be surprising is that this pattern is
reversed in both solo and joint bid equations for OCS Sale #39 (Gulf of
Alaska) . Members of the industry may have their own explanation for
this reversal, but it is conceivable that the significantly higher costs
and harsher operating environment of the Alaskan province diminish the
attractiveness of all but the largest geological structures located
there.
The measure of development risk (SD) also performs consistently
across equations. The variable enters five of six joint bid equations
with a negative sign, four times with statistical significance. This
result lends additional support to the hypothesis of risk aversion (at
least among the firms that have tendered joint bids), and strongly con-
tradicts the prediction of the option pricing model. Both measures of
risk (DHR and SD) exert less influence in the sample of solo bids. In-
deed, development risk enters none of the solo bid equations with sta-
tistical significance, and on only two occasions with a negative sign.
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This result is again consistent with the hypothesis of decreasing risk
aversion among large firms and cannot be explained by the hypothesis of
differential efficiency in the development of offshore resources.
6. Summary
Bidding patterns in recent OCS lease sales provide strong evidence
in support of four important hypotheses
:
(1) Greater competition for OCS leases inspires all participants
to bid more aggressively. There is no evidence that the
phenomenon of winner's curse is sufficiently important to
lead to the adoption of non-aggressive bidding strategies.
(2) The majority of firms in the industry exhibit significant
aversion to risk, but the degree of risk aversion decreases
among larger firms and may eventually disappear.
(3) The mechanism of joint bidding, which facilitates the pooling
and diversification of risk, has enabled consortia to bid more
than individual members would under a regime of solo bidding.
This conclusion may not apply to the seven major firms, who
appear to have attained a position of risk neutrality. Not
surprisingly, it is precisely this group of firms that have
been the most active solo bidders.
(4) Self-sufficiency in crude oil production is not, per se,
of sufficient importance to cause "crude-short" firms to
bid more aggressively for OCS development rights.
These conclusions pertain closely to the debate regarding current
leasing policy options. A traditional goal of leasing policy has been
-28-
to increase the degree of competition for leases. Our results indicate
that this desire is well directed; the degree of competition is the
most significant determinant of bidding behavior in our analysis. Of
course, the analysis does not directly indicate which policy actions,
if any, would encourage greater competition. However, the finding that
most OCS participants exhibit significant aversion to risk suggests
that any policy that is effective in mitigating OCS risks might induce
more extensive and aggressive competition for leases.
The current thrust of leasing policy reform appears to be moving
in this direction. Numerous auction methods currently in experimental
use (e.g., royalty and profit-share bidding) are designed to substitute
production-related payments for the present lump-sum bonus. By effect-
ing this substitution the government would assume a significant portion
of exploration risk, and presumably permit the companies to compete more
aggressively. A disadvantage is that the government's new vehicle for
collecting mineral rents may interfere with subsequent resource develop-
ment by distorting marginal costs, but this carries us beyond the scope
of the present paper.
Finally, an informed policy regarding joint bidding must reflect
the benefits of risk-sharing. Because OCS risks are by nature indi-
visible, and because most firms display considerable aversion to bearing
risk, the benefits of joint bidding appear to be significant. Current
policy, which prohibits joint bidding among the seven largest U.S. oil
companies, but permits it elsewhere, is well-supported by our finding of
decreasing risk aversion. The largest companies have not behaved as if
the problem of indivisibilities were a serious one, but almost everyone
else has.
-29-
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